PUBLIC AND CULTURAL DIPLOMACY

Working Paper Series

Working Paper Series
in Public and Cultural Diplomacy

ISSN: 2784-9589

Working paper no. 6
December 2024

The Idea of Nationalism in Phases of Development and Decline

Saverio Battente

Working Paper Series in Public and Cultural Diplomacy

Layout and graphic design by
Gaea Riondino

A registered publication by
Department of Social Political and Cognitive Sciences
University of Siena
Via Roma 56, 53100 Siena, Italy
e-mail: wpspcd@unisi.it

DISPOC
Interdisciplinary
Department

UNIVERSITÀ
DI SIENA 1240

The Idea of Nationalism in Phases of Development and Decline

Saverio Battente

Abstract

The concept of the nation, around which Western civilisation developed from the Middle Ages to the contemporary era, did not remain unchanged but transformed over the centuries, becoming associated with distinct – and sometimes antithetical – political, economic, and social ideologies. Each nation, in its effort to impose or defend itself, appropriated and developed its own idea of nationalism, i.e. the intensification of what was considered most useful and rightful for the country, elevated to the status of an absolute and primary principle, with its interpretation and justification entrusted to an elite that positioned itself as the sole arbiter and authority. These nationalisms conditioned the domestic and foreign relations of national states as they navigated the challenges of modernisation following the great revolutions of the 18th and 19th centuries. This article aims to explore whether nationalism was merely an empty, neutral container within which autonomous factional ideologies were presented as national and imposed on the international stage, or whether it was itself capable of producing original theories and doctrines that were presented as exclusively nationalist. Additionally, the article seeks to examine whether nationalism, within the contexts of Western and other cultures where it has manifested, supported historical phases of societal growth or decline. Finally, it examines whether nationalism, despite being a product of Western culture, managed to become a distinguishing feature of societies outside that perimeter, which used it to defend themselves or assert their autonomy and eventual primacy.

Saverio Battente is an Associate Professor in the Department of Social, Political and Cognitive Sciences at the University of Siena. He teaches the courses of Communication and Sport, Sports and Culture, and History of Culture. He is the Director of the Course in Sports Club Management and the Cisnareto Interuniversity Centre for the study of Nationalism and Totalitarian Regimes of the Twentieth Century.

e-mail: saverio.battente@unisi.it


pcd
PUBLIC AND CULTURAL DIPLOMACY

Introduction

Nationalism – long examined in international academic literature through an interdisciplinary lens – is a concept that is intrinsically tied to the idea of nation. While a substantial body of studies has emerged attempting to define it (see, for instance, Bobbio, Matteucci and Pasquino, 2016), we aim to explore whether there is a relationship between the appearance and deployment of nationalism in a society and that society's level development or decline. In other words, can nationalism accompany both phases, or is it exclusively associated with one of them? This question will be examined from anthropological, political, economic and geo-cultural perspectives using a diachronic approach.

Furthermore, is nationalism a univocal concept, despite its use by different actors, or has it taken on particular traits over time depending on its application? Can nationalism be defined as a neutral container, a sort of vector harnessed by specific ideologies, doctrines and theories of a political, economic and social nature, or has it developed its own original and exclusive ideologies in antithesis to others? And in any case, has nationalism primarily operated within national contexts, or has it also pursued objectives and assumed dimensions ascribable to international relations? Equally compelling is the relationship between nationalism and the concept of populism, which stems from distinct ideas of nation and people or populace.

Drawing on historical analysis, scientific methodology and various case studies, we will explore these questions across both modern and contemporary eras. As this endeavour aims only to outline and summarise key processes, there will be no attempt to provide definitive and exhaustive answers. Instead, the goal is to contribute to potential interdisciplinary research by offering a foundation for further inquiry. In this respect, it is worth noticing that nationalism, both as a concept and ideology, has been employed across diverse contexts and historical periods due to its capacity to unite a society and shape its trajectory – whether to spur development or delay decline. For example, during the French revolution of 1789, a radicalised notion of the nation emerged from the barricades of Paris, first as means to unite the populace against external enemies and later underpinning Napoleonic expansionism (Furet and Richet, 1987). This proto-nationalism, though not explicitly presented as such, held both defensive and expansive meanings (Soboul, 1987).

The interplay between nationalism and societal development or decline has often been complex. In Revolutionary France, military success was not matched by economic prosperity (Thompson, 1943). Napoleon's war machine, despite its innovations, was rooted in the remnants of the monarchy it had overthrown. Industrial development only merged in the second half of the 19th century under Napoleon III, alongside rising nationalism employed to stave off societal decline (Neal and Cameron, 2003). Moreover, some historiographers, associating nationalism with right-wing authoritarian regimes, argue that fascism originated in 19th-century France, within a divisive civil war scenario that foreshadowed broader Western dualisms between *forces of order and forces of movement* (Vivarelli, 1991).

I In contrast, British nationalism blended with liberalism, presented as universal and considered a unifying force domestically, while serving as a foundation for Empire. Initially a force for development, it later sought to mitigate decline (Hardin, 2003; De Ruggiero, 2003; Hobsbawm, 1962; 1973; 1987; 1990). Figures like Churchill exemplified a nationalism tied to British liberty, navigating periods of both growth and decline (Gilbert, 2013). This approach resurfaced under Margaret Thatcher during the Falklands War (Gibran, 1997). In the United

States, nationalism began as isolationism, in defence of the birth and consolidation of the nascent nation, before evolving into a tool for expansion and global dominance, particularly in the post-WWII era and the Cold War, up to its recent return in support of a system partially in crisis (Borgognone, 2021). Finally, in Australia, the exaggeration of the idea of nation served as a means of defending cultural identity, initially from the motherland's interference and later from the sense of being surrounded by other non-Western national identities.

Nationalism was thus intertwined with ideas of democracy and freedom, becoming both a domestic unifier and an instrument for cultural, economic and political expansion on the international stage. However, it was also a central pillar of reactionary and authoritarian forces. In Spain, Franco's nationalism had a distinctly defensive role, safeguarding a declining world – namely, the rural world of the 19th century (Preston, 1997). In Germany, on the other hand, nationalism quickly became the binding force behind the Prussia-inspired recovery, with both defensive and expansionist objectives characteristic of a society in a growth phase (Ritter, 1968), further radicalised by Nazism (Shirer, 1960). In Italy, nationalism was more ambiguous, positioned between development and decline. It served as a modern tool for the growth of a developing society, while simultaneously defending an outmoded rural society (Gaeta, 1981). Thus, nationalism proved to be an expression of authoritarian and totalitarian ideologies on the right, driven by both defensive and expansive motives.

On the left side of the ideological spectrum, the USSR also reappropriated themes of nationalism – previously seen in a declining tzarist Russia – though in a cryptic form, adapting them to the concept of class to support the imperialist ideology of communism (Carr, 1978) and, later, to reinforce Russian leadership on the domestic level as it sought recovery and resurgence after the Soviet collapse.

Nationalism has been used as a tool outside the Western context as well. In China, it directly or indirectly supported the opposing ideological motives of both sides during the civil war, acting as a defence against the colonial exploitation endured by the ancient empire, while also prompting development and unifying the nation domestically (Roberts, 1999). Remaining in Asia, nationalism accompanied Japanese imperialism, as well as Indian and Pakistani decolonisation, fused in all three cases with religious as well as ideological motivations (Di Nolfo, 1994). As far as the relationship with religious elements is concerned, nationalism in the Middle East fostered the genesis of Israel as well as some Arab nations, hovering between secularism and fundamentalism. The Turkish case is particularly emblematic: as the country rose from the ashes of the Ottoman Empire after World War I, the nationalism of Kemal Atatürk was a crucial force in its secularisation (Campanini, 2018). In Africa and South America, nationalism propped up most post-colonial independence movements, often merging with radical right-wing or left-wing, or ethnic/religious ideological impulses (Formigoni, 2018). In these regions, the connections to modernisation challenges and relations with Western civilisation have made nationalism a critical element, both as a defence of origins and as a means of acculturation.

Nationalism, therefore, can be understood as a versatile concept and ideology, applied in various contexts and historical phases due to its capacity to unify societies, promote development, and delay decline. It is pervasive in the phase of expansion of a societal model as well as in efforts to defend its survival. Understanding the type of nationalism at play is of great importance for understanding historical periods and the identity of the society under study.

The Idea of Nation

The modern idea of nation, as applied by Voltaire (1764), Vico (1939) and Rousseau (1755), began to take shape during the French Revolution, influenced by the Enlightenment, and was later redefined through Romanticism, drawing on ideas from Herder and Fichte (Albertini, 1981). For Herder (1767), the nation was linked to a view of the populace sharing principles and values, whereas for Fichte (1808), the accent was placed on ethnic and anthropological traits, including race (Chabod, 1961). In any case, the aspect of linguistic and cultural commonality remained essential, along with the presence of a defined territory and a governing state (Smith, 2007). It was Mazzini, however, who articulated the concept of the nation as the natural foundation of the organising political power, merging it with the idea of the state (Mazzini, 1943). Thus, the concept of that nation took on a cultural value – *kulturnation* – and a more political and institutional one – *staatnation* (Meinecke, 1908).

Consequently, the nation could not only have a genetic basis linked to birth, as per its Latin etymology, or an ethical foundation rooted in intellectual origin, but could also take on the value of a constitutional contract. In this sense, the nation could replace the constitutional homeland, functioning as a sort of *pactum* (Habermas, 1985). Historically, the Latin term *natio* held a negative connotation, referring to anything that – in particularistic terms – lay outside the universalistic scope of Roman identity, characterised by tribal bonds and in contrast with concepts like *populus* or *civitas,* which were associated with specific institutions (Chabod, 1961). Over time, however, the idea of nation became linked to the principle of the State, outliving the more generic, primitive anthropological and cultural meaning referring to a broader collectivity, as well as the localistic idea of a 'piccola patria' or hometown.

During the medieval period, with the emergence of nation states, the nation came to coincide with the idea of the State as embodied by the monarchy (Volpe, 1927; Chabod, 1961; Romeo, 1981). In terms of identity, religious belonging took precedence, followed by attachment to the 'piccola patria', with national identity emerging last (Shafer, 1955). After the French Revolution, however, national identity assumed primary significance, consistent with the secularisation of both society and the State. While the monarchy had represented the national identity up to that point, the concept of the *people* took centre stage after the Revolution. In cases where political-institutional unity was lacking, the theme of the 'piccola patria' remained crucial, as seen in Italy, where it gave rise to a nation made up of 'a thousand campaniles', based on the primacy of municipalism (Volpe, 1949; Croce, 1947; Chabod, 1961).

Over the course of the long 19th century and the 'short century' that followed, the idea of the nation had to confront and conjoin with various political ideologies, in what has been defined as the 'Western civil war' between *forces of order* and *forces of movement*. This included right-wing authoritarianism and totalitarianism, like fascism and Nazism, left-wing ideologies like socialism and communism (despite their formal focus on the principle of class, which was antithetical to the idea of the nation), and liberal democratic doctrines (Nolte, 1987).

The term 'nation' was initially conceived as a natural bond, referring to the idea of race, in an exclusivist approach rooted in tradition. It was linked not only to shared genetic traits but also to a common anthropological view, language and territory. This led to the idea of nation as living, collective organism – almost an extrapolation of the principle of the organic nature of the State (Meinecke, 1908). A contrasting, inclusivist conception was also

proposed, again focusing on territory and language, but emphasising shared values, akin to a continuous voluntary plebiscite (Renan, 1887). In this view, the nation was tied to the idea of the State, although the former could exist independently of the latter, driven solely by its own action (Cardini, 1996). The State likewise took on different forms and ideologies. Most importantly, major revolutions introduced a new idea of the State – no longer monocratic, but bureaucratic-administrative, with varying degrees of centralisation or decentralisation.

Within the liberal democratic framework of the Anglo-Saxon world, which focused on the principles of decentralisation and self-government, a more centralistic version began to make headway (Rokkan, 1980; Flora et al. 1999). At the same time, the concept of the organic State, based on its own authority and its supremacy over civil society, began to take shape (Schiera, 1987). In response to the challenges of modernity, authoritarianism sought to root its ideological foundations in the concept of the nation, constructing models aligned with its doctrinal theories. For Marx, in fact, the idea of nation was merely an artifice intended to legitimise the supremacy of the bourgeoisie (Marx and Engels, 1977; Furet, 1995). So, alongside the idea of nation, the alternative concept of class as an identity category gained prominence, blending to some extent with the principles of the State, only to ultimately be absorbed into the national system, despite its classist nature.

In the modern era, to summarise briefly, more or less homogeneous states and nations have clashed in their pursuit of hegemony, driven by revolutions (initially religious in nature) and conflicts between distinct, often antagonistic models for global supremacy. This complex web of events unfolded within Western civilisation, leading to the hypothesis of a kind of Occidental (if not strictly European) civil war between the long and short centuries (Nolte, 1987; Hobsbawm, 1994). Moreover, around the turn of the short century, an abstract notion emerged regarding the obsolescence of the idea of nation, promoted in the name of international cosmopolitanism and globalisation, with the aim of forming new macro-subjects to counter the European integration process. These subjects, however, remained firmly anchored to the principle of nation. Indeed, this process not only revived the vitality of nations, leading to a resurgence of radical nationalistic intensification in the Western context, but also, after decolonialisation, in societies outside its perimeter. For these societies, the idea of nation, in its various Western-derived forms, served as fortification against the West itself in their reciprocal relations.

The Idea of Nationalism

The idea of nationalism, closely tied to the ideology and construction of the nation state, emerged as an attempt to impose a specific view and position itself as its sole interpreter (Shafer, 1955). With the collapse of the *ancien régime* and the absolutist monarchy, the process of nation building became associated with distinct ideologies, serving as an original response to the challenges of modernisation. Presumably, the term ‘nationalism’ was first used by Herder in 1770 in support of his idea of nationhood (Herder, 1767). Nationalism thus came to the fore starting with the great modern and contemporary revolutions, accompanying transformations in the concepts of state and nation. These were no longer associated with dynasties but with populaces, anchored to specific political doctrines (Albertini, 1981). The French Revolution introduced this new concept as a means of consolidating itself domestically while exporting its values abroad, presenting them as universal principles. The

Napoleonic era continued in the same direction, bringing an initial burst of nationalist sentiments, often in the form of resistance against French expansion, as seen clearly in the Prussian model (Chabod, 1961).

Simultaneously, a social rift was looming as well. During the long 19th century, the middle classes championed nationalism, first as a tool to combat the Restoration, then as a driving force behind the rise of free trade, and finally as the ideological foundation of imperialism during the 'Great Depression' and the return to protectionism in the runup to the World Wars (Hobsbawm, 1987; Webster, 1975). The creation of independent nation states, distinct from the large supranational empires, became a defining feature of the 19th century. Nationalism also brought the masses into the idea of the nation, engaging them in various (active or passive) ways (Weber, 1976; Mosse, 1975).

Nationalism thus became the ideology of modern states, asserting their autonomy while also embodying the aspirations of stateless nations seeking independence and sovereignty. In this sense, it assumed a positive value, almost synonymous with patriotism, as the legitimate pursuit of a people striving for self-governance and independence. Nationalism supported and served the idea of the sovereign state, which emerged victorious over the feudal principles of the *ancien régime*, in terms of independence on the international level and domestic superiority over competing powers and institutions, such as the Church (Chabod, 1961).

In contrast to the authoritarian framework of state interest rooted in the tenets of royal absolutism, nationalism – particularly after the great revolutions – introduced the concept of the people as the ultimate repository of sovereignty, from which state authority derived. Domestically, this paved the way for the abstract notion of equal rights for all members of the nation, who were recognised as citizens rather than mere subjects. Internationally, nationalism became synonymous with the principle of self-determination and the pursuit of independence. However, the idea of the nation also became entwined with the dualism of the main political ideologies that emerged from the revolutionary period, setting the stage for profound conflicts – initially within states and later between them on the global stage.

For example, the democratic principle aimed to establish political equality, while the national principle sought to place the state in the hands of the people, in line with Rousseau's philosophy (Rousseau, 1755). Rational bureaucratic organisation and the democratic governance were gradually replacing the personalistic rule of monarchic absolutism, regardless of how enlightened the latter might have been. This process, although guided by principles of freedom and equality and aimed at liberation from royal absolutism, did not impede the genesis of social and individual divides that were politically significant. The concept of brotherhood, tied to the introduction of the idea of the nation and its people, was able to mediate and minimise these potential fractures. Internally, primary nationalism supported the state's ideology by fostering cohesion within a national entity conceived as natural, whether based on shared values or ethnic traits (which could be either inclusivist or exclusivist). It imposed homogeneity in language, rights and laws across the autonomous, independent territory of the nation. Nationalism allowed for the creation and imposition of a national identity, in part through the enforcement of a common idiom, shared values and lifestyles. In reality, a 'natural' nation would never have come into existence spontaneously: rather, it was the product of a state-building process and the corresponding construction of the national entity (Popper, 1945). It was the state that created the nation and its ideology, nationalism (Cardini, 1996).

However, this nationalism was far from self-evident. On the contrary, it was framed as a product of liberal principles proclaimed to be universal, even as it underpinned English or French mandates. Alongside liberal democratic ideology, other ideologies quickly arose, often shaped by the demands of foreign relations between states and internal balances of power. These ideologies proposed alternative paths and approaches, frequently driven by overtly nationalist credos, as exemplified by the German case. In this sense, nationalism often acquired a negative connotation, manifesting as an exaggeration of authoritarian tendencies in the name of the good of the nation, directly opposing liberal and democratic principles.

In other words, nationalism became a vehicle for distinct ideologies of Western tradition, serving both to confront the challenges of modernisation and, in some cases, to repudiate it. The dynamic laid the groundwork for a kind of civil war within Western civilisation, which in turn helped justify global imperialism (Nolte, 1987).

The nation-state operated on the principle of elections as a legitimate expression of the people's will within the framework of liberal doctrine. This approach was associated with wither state centralism or local self-government, depending on the system. The foundations of this structure were the nation itself and the citizen, regarded as the bearer of natural rights. In this respect, nationalism – however cryptic or implicit it may have been – emerged as a critical force, mediating and shaping the system's direction and outcomes. Domestically and internationally, the school, army and bureaucracy became the essential pillars of the nation state, ensuring its stability and safeguarding its interests.

The State took on central importance, aligning itself with nationalism as both a defence mechanism and a sacred legitimisation of its decisions. This alignment effectively supplanted civil society, steering it towards greater uniformity and homogeneity (Smith, 1987). The Anglo-Saxon model, however, diverged significantly, emphasising the primacy of civil society and diversity. In this model, the State's role was limited to safeguarding and defending society through laws and norms, which it also proposed as a template for other nations. In some ways, Anglo-Saxon nationalism was more intertwined with the social fabric and individual identities than with the machinery of the State.

In contrast, to resist the cultural expansionism fostered by Anglo-Saxon nations, countries like Germany developed a form of nationalism that bolstered the authority and sovereignty of the State. Initially defensive, this nationalism evolved into a tool for authoritarian expansion. Through the authoritarian State, nationalism became a reaction against liberal culture, replacing it with an organic vision that ultimately led to totalitarian regimes. Respect for individual freedom was substituted with respect for citizens' dignity, upheld in the name of the nation.

Amid the diversification of ideologies to deal with the challenges of modernity, and in a climate of growing antagonism and competitiveness, the idea of nation melded with specific models of nationalism. These models came to dominate the organisation of societal life and the pursuit of national interests. In the absence of effective supranational institutions – or even in their presence when they proved powerless – the principle of equality among nations was often supplanted by *realpolitik*. Nationalism thus became an instrument for the defence or expansion of nation-states, which did not repudiate war as an extreme means of resolving conflicts of any nature. This dynamic revealed a tension between universal revolutionary, ethical and religious values and the nationalist particularism that dominated the era. According to Mazzini, the theoretical attempt to mediate between these was incomplete (Mazzini, 1943).

Beginning with the French Revolution, which aimed to export the ideals of freedom, a substantial continuity emerged power politics, security policies, and reasons of State. Nationalism expressed these principles early on, replacing the 'love of the people' associated with 'patriotism' (Barruel, 1798). National sentiments like attachment to the homeland and love for the nation – ideally balance with brotherhood and solidarity among nations – ended up blending indistinguishably with nationalism's tendencies towards bellicosity and hostility. In other words, a country's own nationalism was perceived as 'good', while that of other countries was deemed 'bad' (Chabod, 1961).

Nationalism was not merely a pathological deviation from the idea of the nation but a necessary consequence of it. After an initial humanitarian version of nationalism advocated by Rousseau and Herder, which was linked in various ways to liberty, there emerged other iterations: a radical, revolutionary nationalism under Jacobin leaders like Robespierre and Murat; a liberal nationalism championed by figures like Guizot, Burke and Cavour; and an economic nationalism rooted in List's neo-mercantilist theories.

Nationalism thus passed through distinct phases: an anthropological and artistic phase marked by the rediscovery of the *volk*; a political awakening among various groups; and finally, a mass consecration. Chronologically, nationalism underwent an integrative phase, followed by a disunifying phase, an aggressive phase, and ultimately the contemporary phase (Snyder, 1954). As nationalism intertwined with different – and sometimes antagonistic – ideologies, it produced dualities tied to the idea of the nation that remained unresolved, even by entities and institutions purporting to embody universal values. Despite these complexities, nationalism itself became an ideology with its own internal coherence and purpose, frequently aligned with authoritarian or totalitarian tenets. Yet, nationalism was also celebrated as a guiding star in nations governed by other systems, including democratic and liberal regimes, often invoked in the name of those very doctrines.

Beginning with the French Revolution, nationalism became a pervasive force, accompanying various regimes and governments to varying degrees, particularly in the context of foreign relations within Western civilisation, marked by internal clashes and aspirations for global hegemony (Furet, 1995). During the Cold War, the duality of nation versus class emerged as a framework for both foreign and domestic models. The amplification of the concept of class into classism was an attempt to replicate the nation/nationalism duality, operating within a similarly imperialist logic embedded in Western culture (Smith, 1987). In this manner, nationalism gave rise to parallel anti-colonial movements, often grounded in notions of nationhood that diverged from Western paradigms, emphasising ethnic or religious principles. Supranational processes, far from suffocating or homogenising the nations involved, frequently stalled and triggered a resurgence of nationalism. Indeed, the end of the ideological clash did not herald 'the end of history', but rather a new phase in which nationalism once again played a key role in shaping both Western and non-Western cultures (Fukuyama, 1992; 2004).

Nationalism in Phases of Decline and Development: The Domestic and International Context

Ideas of nation and nationalism were deeply intertwined with the challenges brought about by modernisation following the great revolutions (Chabod, 1961). During the medieval period

and early modern periods, as mentioned above, the idea of the nation had coincided with great monarchies and their absolutist concentrations of power. Instead of nationalism, there existed a form of dynastic familism, where the fortunes of reigning houses and their attempts to assert dominance domestically and internationally took precedence. What mattered most was not the nation itself but the fate of the individual family that represented it (Tilly, 1975; 1993).

After the French Revolution, as previously noted, the concepts of nation and nationalism came to be associated with the one of the populace. This shift transformed the entire approach to the power struggle. Until then, albeit with notable exceptions, a more or less homogeneous group of subjects competed for continental and colonial primacy: ideology, political and economic doctrines, and the idea of State and society had remained within a circumscribed perimeter, with religion being the most significant exception, having long anticipated the emergence of broader and more complex societal rifts. The great revolutions of the modern era began to lay the groundwork for increasingly marked dualities in which antagonism extended beyond mere power contests to include conflicts between foundational models shaping society, the State, and the economy.

Nationalism, as a singular, authentic interpretation of modernisation, played a key role from its inception. Sometimes it served to defend tradition against change; at other times, it supported transformation in the name of progress. It was associated with both declining nations and those on the rise.

In England, nationalism was associated with the principles of liberalism and the open society. Although presented as a torchbearer for universal culture, it politically and economically bolstered the genesis of the British Empire and the phase of intense development and predominance of the British model in the 18th and 19th centuries (Hobsbawm, 1962). English nationalism, while ostensibly promoting liberalism, fostered the era of free trade and solidified London's primacy in that sphere (Hobsbawm, 1973). Its objective was to export the English cultural model as a prelude to achieving international hegemony. The Anglo-Saxon idea of nation was presented and supported by English nationalism as a right and necessity for national movements on the Continent, in contrast to the *ancien régime*, provided they adopted its liberal identity. With regard to colonialism, British nationalism served to theorise, support, and legitimise the superiority of the Empire, often with racial and anthropological-cultural connotations. Internally, liberalism used the idea of the nation as a unifying element to bridge divisions created by the Industrial Revolution, including class and regional disparities, generating a form of nationalism oriented towards the common good.

Over the course of the long century, English nationalism – or national liberalism – while opposing other nationalisms, facilitated the development of the British model and the attainment of international hegemony through its Empire. Any alternative notion of nation that diverged from the Anglo-Saxon model was dismissed and criticised as radical. However, when liberal nationalism in England adopted more conservative traits towards the end of the Victorian age, the country's growth slowed, ushering in a period of decline that culminated in the loss of hegemony and the collapse of the Empire during the World Wars. During this time, a self-aware nationalism made headway in England; a reaction against the liberal and democratic principles of the open society, which were increasingly seen as outdated. Particularly after the financial crisis of 1929, this nationalism sought inspiration from authoritarian models, such as Fascist and Nazi dictatorships, as potential solutions to halt the ongoing crisis.

In summary, nationalism, conceived as a defence of the nation's welfare through specific political and economic policies and theories, accompanied both the rise and decline of the nation in the English model. It served as a tool as much for development and defence on both domestic and international fronts. Churchill, reflecting on art as the mirror of a nation, famously remarked that without tradition a nation is like a flock without a shepherd, but without innovation it is a corpse (Churchill, 1956-1958).

The major cultural movements of the time also engaged with the concepts of nation and nationalism. The Enlightenment, for instance, laid the cultural and rational foundations for the modernisation of the idea of progress, affecting the very idea of the nation and its nationalism. While initially seeking dialogue with old monarchies through the idea of enlightened despotism, the Enlightenment eventually contributed to the growth of national particularism in defence of English and French cultural hegemony. Romanticism, on the other hand, rooted in tradition and emotions, was deeply connected to national and nationalist values. Sometimes it defended the *ancien régime* system; at other times, it exalted the nation as a central actor in modernisation while respecting its various particularisms.

An early form of Spanish nationalism, emerging after the Napoleonic wars, drew from both Enlightenment and Romantic ideals. However, it remained tied to the idea of the crown rather than the people, relying on crucial support from the Church. It was employed to defend against the decline of the Spanish Empire in a period of crisis, motivated by denial and rejection of modernisation. At the same time, the patriotism of pro-French Spanish officers took on the guise of liberal nationalism, striving for progress in South America after the enactment of the Constitution of Cádiz.

In France, after 1789, French nationalism presented itself as a universal value but, in practice, served to construct and consolidate a political, social and economic empire under Napoleon (Lefebvre, 2011). While nationalism in England had been associated with economic growth within a framework of liberal values, in France, it evolved into a militarist, expansionist ideology. Although still tied with revolutionary principles, it followed the same power dynamics of the *ancien régime*, without being anchored in genuine economic development. In fact, France's economic take-off only occurred under Napoleon III in the second half of the 19th century, propelled by English hegemony. This was symbolised by the Cobden-Chevalier Treaty, which marked a departure from long-standing mercantilism in favour of Adam Smith's economic theories.

Nationalism thus appeared to be an abstract, generic vessel into which specific theories could be inserted and presented as being for 'the good of the nation'. What differentiated its impact was not so much the substance of its theories as the political propaganda and rhetoric used to present them. In France, nationalism also assumed unique traits in defence of tradition, especially after the debacle of Sedan in 1870. The period laid the groundwork for a slow-moving civil war between two distinct societal models, epitomised by the Dreyfus Affair: homeland versus honour as emblems of two distinct visions of France (Febvre, 1996).

The *Camelots du roi* associated with Maurras and Barrès' *Action française*, represented an effort to create a specific nationalist doctrine capable of steering the nation through times of crisis. French nationalism initially sought to support national development and later aimed to address a state of crisis and decline. It began as rhetoric borrowed from the ideologies that emerged from 1789 and eventually developed into an independent doctrine that either reacted to other ideologies or directly opposed them to tackle modernisation's

challenges – whether by addressing and overcoming them or by outright rejecting them (Hobsbawm, 1990). Meanwhile, Germanic traditions began to exert an increasing influence, shaping the development of French nationalism further.

German nationalism, which initially emerged in Prussia from Fichte's philosophy in the wake of Romanticism as a response to Napoleonic expansionism, quickly adopted a specific connotation. It became centred around an exclusivist sense of identity linked to the idea of the *volk* and race (Chabod, 1961). This formed the basis of authoritarian theories of the organicist state in response to liberalism. From an economic standpoint, the idea of markets and cooperation was supplemented by a neo-mercantilist perspective, advocating for a public-sector role rather than relying on the invisible hand of the market (Cardini, 1996). This form of nationalism supported the growth and rise of the Prussian martial model and the German Second Reich following the reunification of Germany. It was closely tied to the country's development as it strived to catch up to England, eventually becoming the prototype of the Second Industrial Revolution (Neal and Cameron, 2003).

Domestically, German nationalism imposed a social order on Germany, silencing any form of class struggle and replacing it with a paternalistic, state-delegated form of *pulpit socialism* (Crankshaw, 1988). On the international stage, however, German nationalism propped up Berlin's ambition to gain power, pursuing imperialist and expansionist aims (Hobsbawm, 1990). Finally, Hitler's Nazism bent nationalist logics to serve the regime's totalitarian needs in reaction to the crisis triggered in 1929, whose roots lay in military defeat in WWI and the Weimar Republic, which acted as a stimulus for development.

In Italy, after quickly abandoning the patriotic commitment to achieving independence during the period of Unification, nationalism took on peculiar political tones, attributed to an authoritarian bent based on the German organicist model, starting with Crispi, who was an admirer of Bismark. Moreover, at the start of the 20th century, it was presented as a political ideology reinforcing the Italian desire for power, consistent with the rhetoric of the pursuit of a 'place in the sun' in the struggle between proletarian and plutocratic nations as conceived by Enrico Corradini (Corradini, 1980). The nationalism extolled by Alfredo Rocco, incorporated into the Fascist regime, supported the country's industrialisation, as well as the preservation of its rural provincial tradition.

Spanish nationalism, on the other hand, was a reaction of an old-regime state to its own decline, and paved the way for the authoritarianism of the Franco regime (Preston, 1997). Outside Europe, Japan used nationalism as an ideology of emancipation from Western domination, and later as a theory to challenge its predominance, springing from the concept of domestic harmony in the name of tradition (Halliday, 1975). In this instance, the call to safeguard the past was not merely the defence of a world in decline, but rather a bastion to autochthonously and nationally manage modernisation without submitting to its Western version.

In these cases, nationalism, elaborating original theories and also referencing the past, was set forth as an element of development, certainly not of decline, accompanying the growth of Germany, Japan and other nations. However, this form of nationalism was also interpreted as societies' sterile response to the challenges of progress, one that brought about their collapse through military defeats in the World Wars.

In American culture, nationalism played an important role from its revolutionary origins during the War of Independence. More overtly than in Britain, the glorification of the idea of nation in the US went hand in hand with an original definition of it, distinct from Continental

experiences. Domestically, although presented as patriotism, American nationalism served to provide a shared identity for a varied, multi-faceted population. On the international level, however, it was employed mainly to assert its hegemony through the 'big stick' theory, and later to lay the groundwork for expansionist imperialism in keeping with the principles of 'manifest destiny' and the exportation of the American way of life (Maldwyn, 1983; Bergamini, 2002). American nationalism thus served first to consolidate the nation, and then to orient its rise and development. During the World Wars, American nationalism took on the task of defending Western values, presented as universal. This tone persisted throughout the Cold War years (Borgognone, 2021). Recently, however, the nationalism evoked by Donald Trump has seemed much more similar to an instrument used in defence of a nation in crisis, or worse, in decline (Whiticker, 2016; Kellner, 2016). The second Trump term, however, appears to support the hypothesis of a more deliberate strategy rooted in a specific political and economic ideology. This ideology is framed as a defence of American tradition, but also as an alternative reinterpretation of liberal and democratic principles – a vision of the nation's longed-for rebirth.

In Russia, during the 19th and early 20th centuries, on the other hand, pan-Slavic nationalism served to emphasise Moscow's hegemony over all Slavic cultures. Internally, nationalism was expressed as an ideology aimed at the conservation and defence of tradition, in this case, of a now-obsolete system (Kissinger, 1957). In fact, the October Revolution had wiped out that traditional world, replicating elements of it in the construction of a socialist state focused on the idea of class rather than nation. In any case, the principles of nationalism, when applied to class, ended up becoming the compass that guided a system in the pursuit of development that could achieve a significant growth, though with imperialist (albeit classist) logic (Furet, 1995). The collapse of the USSR highlighted the possibility that this type of socialist nationalism was an ambiguous hybrid of a society and a system in decline, rather than a reflection of its own prosperity. The new Russia seemed to have reprised the old 19th-century power-based nationalism as a means to come back into the fold of Western culture without truly being acculturated into it, preferring autocratic authoritarianism to democratic liberalism.

South and Central American nationalism, although expressed in specific ways in individual nations, took on both a defensive value and one of support for a system split between the desire to modernise along the lines of values brought from Europe by Napoleonic exiles and the rural-society traditions of the conservative old-regime colonial factions. For example, Argentine Peronism fused populism and nationalism into an ideology within the context of a Cold War logic (Di Nolfo, 1994). Regardless of ideologies, the figure of the charismatic dictatorial leader was recurrent in South and Central America, tied to nationalist appeals that ranged from yearning for development to maintenance and management of the status quo. The case of Castroism was emblematic (Guerra, 2012; Di Nolfo, 1994).

In Asia, nationalism again assumed anti-colonial tones, vacillating between calls for progress and conservation. During the 20th century, China experienced a sort of ideological and military civil war, in which nationalism supported both Chiang Kai-shek's movement and Mao's communism – distinct and even antithetical ideologies. For Chiang, nationalism was the unifying force that drove China's defence against Japan, presented as necessary for internal cohesion. At the same time, it was used as a principle against Mao's communism, who was regarded as a betrayal backed by Moscow, in the country's domestic conflict before, during and after World War II. Chiang's nationalism entailed coexistence between tradition

and selected elements of modernisation linked to Western, American culture. The political and ideological division between East and West had great importance in favouring the survival of his form of nationalism in Taiwan, even after Mao's military victory (Fenby, 2003). The aim was to modernise the economy without revolutionising society.

Mao, on the other hand, wanted to use communism as a form of classist nationalism that could impose social order on the Chinese nation and enhance its prospects for future power. The centrality of the nation with regard to class as an identity element was immediately evident in the country's relations with Moscow (Short, 1999). Rather than being submissive to the USSR, Beijing took the bold step of opening a dialogue with the US through Kissinger and Nixon's ping-pong diplomacy (Ito, 2011; Millwood, 2022). The aim was to make China a global power.

Paradoxically, but not coincidentally, nationalists in Taiwan have recently positioned themselves closer to Beijing than to Washington, driven by a shared desire for power in an anti-Western perspective. Thus, Chinese nationalism accompanied the growth and development of the Chinese model in both Taiwan and Beijing, while communism was progressively diluted, remaining only as a façade.

In Korea, too, nationalism supported two different regimes inspired by very different, antithetical ideologies. And finally, in India and in Pakistan, nationalism took on religious elements to address internal issues while also fostering the desire to become great powers, a goal that accompanied post-colonial development (Formigoni, 2018). In fact, nationalism was a means of emancipation, as well as a strategy to avoid being drawn into Cold-War ideological neo-colonialism by choosing an autonomous, independent, hybrid third way, while playing a leading role among non-aligned countries after the Bandung Conference.

Nationalist developments on the African continent had quite a different impact. Nationalism had a more tribalistic character, and during the colonial era, it was used by colonising powers to impose themselves more effectively through the divide-and-conquer strategy. With decolonisation, however, the intensification of the idea of nation took on the primary role of defending against Western culture and asserting autonomy. Yet, the militaristic, authoritarian, communist or democratic principles underlying these various nationalisms were, in fact, the products of Western culture. Nationalism also took on a racial character, as in South Africa (Formigoni, 2018). In general, it struggled to motivate the development and growth of new societies, as the weight of tradition continued to hinder such efforts.

In Oceania as well, nationalism served as both a defence and ethnic redress for the indigenous populations, taking on a tribal nature. However, it was also responsible for merging these populations' needs and traditions with progress, making nations into shared homes for distinct ethnic groups and overcoming their conflicts in the name of a shared identity. Nationalism acted in this sense on the domestic level, taking on defensive tones only in situations of international conflict, particularly when potential danger from rising Asian countries was perceived (Rhodes, 2024).

A separate category must be reserved for nationalism associated with religious issues in the Middle East and the Arab world. In fact, Islamism became a form of radicalisation around which society and the State were unified. Nationalism was initially an element of defending state authority from religious interference or superimposition, and often took on military tones, as in Egypt under Nasser, in Libya with Gaddafi, and in Iraq with Saddam (Campanini, 2018).

However, nationalism took a different path in the case of the nationalism of Kemal Atatürk and the Young Turks (Lewis, 2000), where an attempt at Westernisation was considered necessary for the country's modernisation, fostering autonomy and independence. Nationalism thus played both an internal role within civil society and an external role in international relations as nations sought their autonomy.

Arab Islamism, in some ways, functioned as a form of religious nationalism that preserved tradition from the pressures of progress, without sacrificing the economic benefits of participation in the global system. The cases of Iran, Saudi Arabia and the Arab Emirates are emblematic of this approach. More recently, however, Islamic fundamentalism has superseded nationalism, disavowing the ideas of nation and class as foreign, and replacing them with that of the religious community.

Another key example of religiously-oriented nationalism is of course Israel and the Jewish nation. Unlike the Arab cases, in Israel, nation and religion were inseparable; the religious element was unequivocal, bringing together people from very different geographic areas and cultures after the *diaspora* and the *Shoah*, serving as a unifying force across diverse traditions and political cultures. Israeli nationalism accompanied the growth of the young state, facilitating its development (albeit not without internal conflicts), and also acted as a shield against the perceived threats to its existence, which became a daily reality for the country's people (Fraser, 1995).

Recently, nationalism seems to have regained significant importance in Western Europe, with internecine divisions in the EU and the development of movements like Orban's in Hungary and Le Pen's in France, as well as in the US with Trump, often tinged with populism. Ukraine has leveraged a strong, war-oriented nationalism, long in place even before the current military conflict, to defend its aspirations to consolidate a liberal democratic culture. In these cases, nationalism has not been focused on development but rather on helping a society in decline to reassert itself in the pursuit of 'a place in the sun'. A new form of nationalism has emerged as a response to the failure of old nationalisms and the collapse of their world order, as a means to pursue a new equilibrium amid the disorder of multipolar world.

Conclusion

With the genesis and rise of the idea of the nation, its conceptual radicalisation – nationalism – immediately began to take hold. But like the principle of the nation itself, nationalism has many interpretations and has been defined in distinct, sometimes antithetical, ways over time. Until the modern era, the concept coincided with the idea of monarchy and royal absolutism, serving to defend personalistic and dynastic interests that took precedence over those of the nation. The collection of theories and doctrines linked to the monarchic nation was, in essence, a proto-nationalism, often used, especially in international relations, to support various states' pursuit of power, both on the European continent and in colonies. To a lesser degree, it also served to impose domestic cohesion in defence of the *ancien régime*.

However, with the great modern revolutions, the idea of nation became entwined with a different line of theories associated with the concept of 'the people', giving rise to a new conception of the nation. Nationalism, its radical expression, was transformed in turn. Initially, it took on a dual value as a defence against modernisation: protecting a conservative sphere and providing a means to interpret, manage, and dominate the challenges of progress. As

such, nationalism tended to be defined in unique ways depending on national contexts. It was blended with the major ideologies, with each nation creating its own version in order to specifically legitimise theories presented in the abstract as universal.

Although not always in explicit terms, each nation had a form of nationalism distinct from patriotism. In other words, nationalism was a neutral instrument used by political, economic and social doctrines and theories to gain legitimacy both domestically and internationally, without always being directly acknowledged. In fact, nationalism grew in influence domestically, acting as a unifying force capable of halting or silencing conflicts generated by major social, economic, or political revolutions. It also had a function in international relations, in continuity with the past. Yet at the same time, nationalism ended up expressing a specific theory or doctrine, eventually achieving the status of an original ideology, upheld by some nations as a key internal and external reference point in the context of modernisation. This theory or doctrine ended up being exclusively identified with the nationalist principle, in opposition to other doctrines that indirectly used nationalism as well. Nationalism thus became a tool to support the development of a nation, as well as to defend a society in decline or crisis.

To conclude, nationalism developed within a self-proclaimed Western culture as a means of managing internal relations and legitimising its international primacy through colonialism. It was then absorbed and adapted by colonised nations, both as part of an anti-Western process of emancipation and as a means to impose their own primacy. The resurgence of nationalism in the new century, often associated with the concepts of populism and sovereigntism, is influencing politics in several European states. Notable examples include Orban's Hungary, Le Pen's National Front in France, the Afd in Germany and the Lega in Italy. This trend appears to represent an attempt to address social and cultural crises, perhaps even more so than the economic and political challenges facing much of the continent. Nationalism has emerged as an antagonist to the process of European integration, which it often blames for Europe's decline. This same nationalist fervour seems to define Trump's America and Putin's Russia, marked by a blend of crisis responses and aspirations for national resurgence. Nationalism positions itself as a global reaction to globalisation rather than merely a rejection of it. Beyond the Western sphere, nationalism has reasserted itself as a pivotal framework in international relations – not only in diplomatic terms but also in the use of force, as evidenced by conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East. While most nations might appear too small to act independently in the current geopolitical scenario, the concept of the nation persists as a means of addressing contemporary challenges. Instead of fostering multi-ethnic macro-entities, we are witnessing attempts by certain nations to impose hegemony through processes of forced acculturation, often to the detriment of weaker entities. In this context, nationalism serves as both a unifying force to counteract elements of decline and a tool for promoting development.

References

Albertini, M. (1981). *Lo Stato nazionale*. 2nd edition.Napoli, Esi.

Barruel, A. (1798). *Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire du jacobinisme*. 5 vol. Hambourg, P. Fauche.

Bergamini, O. (2002). *Storia degli Stati* Uniti. Roma-Bari, Laterza.

Bobbio, N., Matteucci, N., and Pasquino, G. (2016). *Dizionario di politica*. Torino, Utet.

Borgognone, G., (2021). *Storia degli Stati Uniti*. Milano, Feltrinelli.

Campanini, G. (2018). *Storia del medio oriente contemporaneo*. Bologna, Il Mulino.

Cardini, A. (1996). *Il grande centro. Una nazione senza stato. Il problema storico dell'arretratezza politica in Italia*. Manduria, Lacaita.

Carr, E. (1978). *A History of Soviet Russia*. London, MacMillan.

Chabod, F. (1961). *L'idea di nazione*. Bari, Laterza.

Churchill, W. (1956-58). *A History of the English speaking peoples*. vol.6. London, Cassel.

Corradini E. (1980), *Scritti e discorsi 1901-1914*. Torino, Einaudi.

Crankshaw, E. (1988). *Otto von Bismarck e la nascita della Germania moderna*. Milano, Mursia.

Croce, B. (1947). *Storia d'Italia dal 1870 al 1915*. Roma-Bari, Laterza.

De Ruggiero, G. (2003). *Storia del liberalismo europeo*. 2nd edition. Roma-Bari, Laterza.

Di Nolfo, E. (1994). *Storia delle Relazioni Internazionali*. Roma-Bari, Laterza.

Febvre, L. (1996). *Honneur et patrie*. Paris, Agorà.

Fenby, J. (2003). *Generalissimo: Chiang Kai-Shek and the China he lost*. New York, The Free Press.

Fichte, J. G. (1808). *Reden an die deutsche Nation*. Berlin, Realschulbuchhandlung.

Flora, P., Kuhnle, S., and Urwin, D. (1999). *State Formation, Nation-Building, and Mass Politics in Europe: The Theory of Stein Rokkan*. Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Formigoni, G. (2018). *La politica internazionale dal XX al XXI secolo*. Bologna, Il Mulino.

Fraser, T. G. (1995). *The Arab Israeli conflict*. London, Macmillan.

Fukuyama, F. (1992). *The End of History and the Last Man*. New York, The Free Press.

Fukuyama, F. (2004). *State-building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century*. Ithaca, Cornell University Press.

Furet., F. (1995). *Le Passé d'une illusion. Essai sur l'idée communiste au XXe siècle*. Paris, Laffont Calmann-Lévy.

Furet, F., and Richet, D. (1987). *La Révolucion Française*. Paris, Fayard.

Gaeta, F. (1981). *Nazionalismo Italiano*. Roma-Bari, Laterza.

Gilbert, M. (2013) *Winston Churchill*. vol.8. Hillsdale, Hillsdale College Press.

Gibran, D. K. (1997). *The Falklands War: Britain Versus the Past in the South Atlantic*. London, McFarland.

Guerra, L. (2012). *Visions of Power in Cuba: Revolution, Redemption, and Resistance*. Chapel Hill, North Carolina University Press.

Habermas, J. (1985). *Die neue Unübersichtlichkeit. Kleine Politische Schriften V*, Frankfurt, A.M.

Halliday, J. (1975). *A Political History of Japanese Capitalism*. New York, Pantheon.

Hardin, R. (2003). *Liberalism, Constitutionalism, and Democracy*. Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Herder, J. G. (1767). *Fragmente über die neuere deutsche Literatur*. Riga, Hartknoch.

Hobsbawm, E. (1962). *The Age of Revolution: Europe. 1789-1848*. London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson.

Hobsbawm, E. (1973). *The Age of Capital 1848-1875*. London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson.

Hobsbawm, E. (1987). *The Age of Empires 1875-1914*. London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson.

Hobsbawm, E. (1990). *Nations and nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Hobsbawm, E. (1994). *The Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century, 1914-1991*. London, Michael Joseph.

Ito, M. (2011). *The origin of ping pong diplomacy*. London, Palgrave Macmillan.

Kellner, D. (2016). *American Nightmare: Donald Trump, Media Spectacle, and Authoritarian Populism*. New York, Sense Publishers.

Kissinger, H. (1957). *A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace, 1812–22*. Boston, Houghton Mifflin.

Lefebvre, G. (2011). *Napoleon*. London, Routledge.

Lewis, B. (2000). *Le molte identità del medio oriente*. Bologna, Il Mulino.

Maldwyn, A.J. (1983). *The Limits of Liberty: American History (1607-1980)*. Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Marx, K., and Engels, F. (1977). *Opere complete*. vol. 50. Roma, Editori Riuniti.

Mazzini, G. (1943). *Scritti editi ed inediti*. vol. 94. Imola, Cooperativa Tipografico-editrice Paolo Galeati.

Meinecke, F. (1908). *Weltbürgertum und Nationalstaat: Studien zur Genesis des deutschen Nationalstaates,* Berlin and München, Oldenbourg.

Millwood, P. (2022). *Improbable diplomats*. New York, Cambridge University Press.

Mosse, G. L. (1975). *The Nationalization of the masses: Political Symbolism and Mass Movements in Germany, from the Napoleonic Wars Through the Third Reich*. New York, Fertig.

Neal, L., and Cameron, R. (2003). *A Concise Economic History of the World: From Palaeolithic Times to the Present*. New York, Oxford University Press.

Nolte, E. (1987). *Der Europäische Bürgerkrieg 1917-1945. Nationalsozialismus und Bolschewismus,* Bonn, Herbig.

Popper, K. R. (1945). *The open society and its enemies*. London, Routledge and Kegan.

Preston, P. (1997). *Francisco Franco*. Milano, Arnoldo Mondadori Editore.

Renan, E. (1887). *Discours et Conferences*. Paris, Calmann-Lévy.

Ritter, G. (1968). *Staatskunst und Kriegshandwerk: Das Problem des «Militarismus» in Deutschland*. Mùnchen, R. Oldenbourg Verlag.

Roberts, J. A. G. (1999). *A History of China*. London, Palgrave.

Romeo, R. (1981). *Italia mille anni*. Firenze, Le Monneir.

Rokkan, S. (1980). *Territori, nazioni, partiti: Verso un modello geopolitico di sviluppo europeo*. *Rivista italiana di Scienza politica*, 10 (3): 437–470.

Rousseau, J. J. (1755). *Discours sur l'origine de l'inégalité*. Amsterdam, Michel Rey.

Schiera, P. (1987). *Il laboratorio borghese. Scienza e politica nella Germania dell'Ottocento,* Bologna, Il Mulino.

Shafer, B. C. (1955). *Nationalism. Mith and reality*. New York, Harcourt Brace.

Shirer, W. L. (1960). *The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich: A History of Nazi Germany*. New York, Simon and Schuster.

Short, P. (1999). *Mao a life*. London, Hodder & Stoughton.

Smith, A. D. (1987). *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*. Hoboken NJ, Blackwell.

Smith, A. D. (2007). *La nazione. Storia di un'idea*. Rubbettino, Soveria Mannelli.

Snyder, L. (1954). *The meaning of nationalism*. Westport, Greenwood.

Soboul, A. (1987). *La Révolution française.* Paris, Arthaud.

Thompson, J. M. (1943). *The French Revolution*. Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Tilly, C. (1975). *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*. Princeton, Princeton University Press.

Tilly, C. (1993). *European Revolutions, 1492-1992*. Cambridge, Wiley-Blackwell.

Vico, G. B. (1939). *Scritti storici*. Bari, Laterza.

Vivarelli, R. (1991). *Storia delle origini del fascismo. L'Italia dalla grande guerra alla marcia su Roma*. Vol. 2. Bologna, Il Mulino.

Volpe, G. (1927). *Italia in cammino*. Milano, Treves.

Volpe, G. (1949). *Italia moderna*. Vol. 3. Firenze, Sansoni.

Voltaire, F. M. (1764). *Dictionnaire philosophique portatif*. London.

Weber, E. (1976). *Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870–1914*. Stanford, Stanford University Press.

Webster, R. (1975). *Industrial imperialism in Italy*. Los Angeles and Berkeley, University of California Press.

Whiticker, A. (2016). *Trumped: The Wonderful World and Wisdom of Donald Trump*. Sydney, New Holland.

Working Paper Series in Public and Cultural Diplomacy

A registered publication by
Department of Social Political and Cognitive Sciences
University of Siena
Via Roma 56, 53100 Siena, Italy
e-mail: wpspcd@unisi.it